A new construction of authentication codes with arbitration from pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields is given. The parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of the codes are also computed. §1 Introduction
§1 Introduction
To solve the distrust problem of the transmitter and the receiver in the communications system, Simmons introduced a model of authentication codes with arbitration (see [1] ), we write symply (A 2 -code) defined as follows:
Let S, E T ,E R and M be four non-empty finite sets, and f : S × E T → M and g : M × E R → S ∪ {reject} be two maps. The six-tuple (S, E T , E R , M ; f, g) is called an authentication code with arbitration (A 2 -code), if
(1) The maps f and g are surjective; (2) For any m ∈ M and e T ∈ E T , if there is an s ∈ S, satisfying f (s, e T ) = m, then such an s is uniquely determined by the given m and e T ; (3) p(e T , e R ) = 0 and f (s, e T ) = m implies g(m, e R ) = s, otherwise, g(m, e R ) = {reject}.
S, E T ,E R and M are called the set of source states, the set of transmitter's encoding rules, the set of receiver's decoding rules and the set of messages, respectively; f and g are called the encoding map and decoding map respectively. The cardinals |S|, |E T |,|E R | and |M | are called the size parameters of the code.
In a authentication system that permits arbitration, this model includes four attendances: the transmitter, the receiver, the opponent and the arbiter, and includes five attacks:
1) The opponent's impersonation attack: the largest probability of an opponent's successful impersonation attack is P I . Then
2) The opponent's substitution attack: the largest probability of an opponent's successful substitution attack is P S . Then
3) The transmitter's impersonation attack: the largest probability of a transmitter's successful impersonation attack is P T . Then
4) The receiver's impersonation attack: the largest probability of a receiver's successful impersonation attack is P R0 . Then
5) The receiver's substitution attack: the largest probability of a receiver's successful substitution attack is P R1 .Then
Notes: p (e R , e T ) = 0 implies that any information s encoded by e T can be authenticated by e R .
In this paper, the t P denotes the transpose of a matrix P . Some concepts and notations refer to [2] . §2 Pseudo-Symplectic Geometry Let F q be the finite field with q elements, where q is a power of 2, n = 2ν + δ and δ=1,2. Let
and S δ is an (2ν + δ) × (2ν + δ) non-alternate symmetric matrix.
The pseudo-symplectic group of degree (2ν + δ) over F q is defined to be the set of matrices P s 2ν+δ (F q ) = {T |T S δ t T = S δ } denoted by P s 2ν+δ (F q ).
Let F (2ν+δ) q be the (2ν +δ) -dimensional row vector space over F q . P s 2ν+δ (F q ) has an action on F (2ν+δ) q defined as follows:
together with this group action is called the pseudo-symplectic space over the finite field F q of characteristic 2.
Let P be an m-dimensional subspace of F (2ν+δ) q , then P S δ t P is cogredient to one of the following three normal forms
for some s such that 0 ≤ s ≤ [m/2]. We say that P ia a subspace of type (m, 2s + τ, s, ǫ), where τ =0,1 or 2 and ǫ =0 or 1, if (i) P S δ t P is cogredient to M (m, 2s + τ, s), and
(ii) e 2ν+1 / ∈ P or e 2ν+1 ∈ P according to ǫ = 0 or ǫ = 1, respectively. Let P be an m-dimensional subspace of F (2ν+δ) q . Denote by P ⊥ the set of vectors which are orthogonal to every vector of P , i.e.,
. More properties of geometry of pseudo-symplectic groups over finite fields of characteristic 2 can be found in [2] .
In [3] [4] [5] several constructions of authentication codes with arbitration from the geometry of classical groups over finite fields were given and studied. In this paper a construction of authentication codes with arbitration from pseudo-symplectic geometry over finite fields is given. The parameters and the probabilities of deceptions of the codes are also computed. §3 Construction
⊥ . The set of source states S = {s|s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) and ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊂ s ⊂ P 0 }; the set of transmitter's encoding rules E T ={e T |e T is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and e T ∩ P 0 = ν 0 , e 2ν+1 }; the set of receiver's decoding rules E R ={e R |e R is a subspace of type (2,2,0,1) in the (2ν + 2)-dimensional pseudo-symplectic space F (2ν+2) q }; the set of messages M = {m|m is a subspace of type (2s + 2, 2s + 2, s, 1), ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊂ m, and m ∩ P 0 is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1)}.
Define the encoding map:
and the decoding map:
) is an authentication code with arbitration, that is (1) s + e T = m ∈ M , for all s ∈ S and e T ∈ E T ; (2) for any m ∈ M , s = m ∩ P 0 is the uniquely source state contained in m and there is e T ∈ E T , such that m = s + e T .
Proof.
(1) For any s ∈ S, s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) and ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊂ S ⊂ P 0 , we can assume that
For any e T ∈ E T , e T is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and e T ∩ P 0 = ν 0 , e 2ν+1 , we can assume that
Obviously, u 1 , u 2 / ∈ S. Hence m = s + e T is a (2s + 2)-dimensional subspace and m ∩ P 0 = s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1). We also have
Therefore, m is a subspace of type (2s+2, 2s+2, s, 1), ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊂ m, and m∩P 0 is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1), i.e., m ∈ M is a message.
(2) If m ∈ M , let s = m ∩ P 0 , then s is a subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) and ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊂ S ⊂ P 0 , i.e., s ∈ S is a source state. Now let
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Let e T = v 0 , e 2ν+1 , u 1 , u 2 . Form ( * ) we deduce that e T is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and e T ∩ P 0 = ν 0 , e 2ν+1 . Therefore e T is a encoding rule of transmitter and satisfying s + e T = m. If s ′ is another source state contained in m, then s ′ ⊂ m, P 0 , i.e., s ′ ⊂ m ∩ P 0 = s. While dims ′ =dims, so s ′ =s, i.e., s is the uniquely source state contained in m.
Assuming the transmitter's encoding rules and the receiver's decoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, we can assume that v 0 , e 2ν+1 = e 1 , e 2ν+1 , then v 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊥ = e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e ν , e ν+2 , · · · e 2ν , e 2ν+1 .
Let n 1 denote the number of subspaces of type (2s, 2(s−1), s−1, 1) contained in ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊥ , and containing ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ; n 2 , the number of subspaces of type (m 0 , 2s 0 , s 0 , 1) contained in ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊥ , and containing a fixed subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) as above; and n 3 , the number of subspaces of type (m 0 , 2s 0 , s 0 , 1) contained in ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊥ , and containing
Where N (m, s; n) is the number of subspaces of type (m, s) in the n-dimensional symplectic space F (n) , where (P 2 , P 3 , P 5 , P 6 ) is a subspace of type (2s − 2, s − 1) in the symplectic space F (2ν−2) q . Therefore, n 1 = N (2s − 2, s − 1; 2ν − 2).
(2) Assume that P is a subspace of type (m 0 , 2s 0 , s 0 , 1) containing a fixed subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) as above and P ⊂ ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊥ . It is easy to know that P has a form as Proof. |S| is the number of subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) contained in P 0 , and containing ν 0 , e 2ν+1 . In order to compute |S|, we define a (0,1)-matrix, whose rows are indexed by the subspaces of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) containing ν 0 , e 2ν+1 and contained in ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊥ whose columns are indexed by the subspaces of type (m 0 , 2s 0 , s 0 , 1) containing ν 0 , e 2ν+1 and contained in ν 0 , e 2ν+1 ⊥ , and with a 1 or 0 in the (i,j) position of the matrix, if the i-th subspace of type (2s, 2(s − 1), s − 1, 1) is or is not contained in the j-th subspace of type (m 0 , 2s 0 , s 0 , 1), respectively. If we count the number of 1's in the matrix by rows, we get n 1 · n 2 , where n 1 is the number of rows and n 2 is the number of 1's in each row. If we count the number of 1's in the matrix by columns, we get n 3 · |S|, where n 3 is the number of columns and |S| is the number of 1's in each column. Thus we have n 1 · n 2 = n 3 · |S|.
Lemma 4. The number of the encoding rules of transmitter is |E T | = q 4(ν−1) .
Proof. Since e T is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and e T ∩ P 0 = ν 0 , e 2ν+1 , the transmitter's encoding rules have the form as follows
Lemma 5. The number of the decoding rules of receiver is |E R | = q 2ν .
Proof. Since e R is a subspace of type (2,2,0,1) in the (2ν + 2)-dimensional pseudosymplectic space F (2ν+2) q , it has the form as follows
Lemma 6. For any m ∈ M , let the number of e T and e R contained in m be a and b, respectively. Then a = q 4(s−1) , b = q 2s .
Proof. Let m be a message. From the definition of m, we may take m as follows: If e R ⊂ m, then we can assume
Lemma 7. The number of the messages is |M | = q 4(ν−s) |S|.
Proof. We know that a message contains a source state and the number of the transmitter's encoding rules contained in a message is a. Therefore we have |M | = |S||E T |/a = q 4(ν−s) |S|.
Lemma 8.
(1) For any e T ∈ E T , the number of e R which is incidence with e T is c = q 2 .
(2) For any e R ∈ E R , the number of e T which is incidence with e R is d = q 2(ν−1) .
(1) Assume that e T ∈ E T , e T is a subspace of type (4,4,1,1) and e T ∩P 0 = ν 0 , e 2ν+1 , we may take e T as follows: .
If e R ⊂ e T , then we can assume
(2) Assume that e R ⊂ E R , e R is a subspace of type (2,2,0,1) in the (2ν + 2)-dimensional pseudo-symplectic space F (2ν+2) q , we may take e R as follows: Lemma 9. For any m ∈ M and e R ⊂ m, the number of e T contained in m and containing e R is q 2(s−1) .
Proof. The matrix of m is like lemma 6, then for any e R ⊂ m, assume that 
From the definition of the message, we may take m 1 and m 2 as follows respectively So it is easy to know that the number of e R contained in m 1 ∩ m 2 is q k .
(2) Assume that m 1 ∩ m 2 has the form of (1), then for any e R ⊂ m 1 ∩ m 2 , we can assume that Theorem 2. In the A 2 authentication codes, if the transmitter's encoding rules and the receiver's decoding rules are chosen according to a uniform probability distribution, the largest probabilities of success for different types of deceptions:
P I = 1 q 2(ν−s) ; P S = 1 q ; P T = 1 q ; P R0 = 1 q 2(ν−s) ; P R1 = 1 q ;
(1) The number of the transmitter's encoding rules contained in a message is b, then
(2) Assume that opponent get m 1 which is from transmitter, and send m 2 instead of m 1 , when s 1 contained in m 1 is different from s 1 contained in m 2 , the opponent's substitution attack can success. Because e R ⊂ e T ⊂ m 1 , thus the opponent select e ′ T ⊂ m 1 , satisfying
